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Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet)
Established in 1959 as an extension of the Red Army’s long-range artillery, the
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) would become the pre-eminent branch of the Soviet
nuclear triad, with the land-based component being more important than the
naval and air branches in terms of resource allocation and prestige. Early Soviet
missile force development was heavily influenced by World War II German rocket
technology and captured German scientists. A significant part of this early
development was directed by Sergei Korolev at Scientific Research Institute 88
near Moscow.
The size of these forces grew significantly following the Cuban Missile Crisis,
which the Soviet leadership saw as a stinging defeat due to their numerical
inferiority in strategic nuclear weapons. SRF infrastructural component
construction, research, and development were influenced by Soviet style
earmarking, with SS-9 missiles being produced by the Dnepropretovsk Missile
Design and Production Center in Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev’s regional
political power base. This enormous governmental financial and political
commitment to bolstering SRF quality and quantity paid dividends and by the late
1970s Moscow had probably achieved strategic superiority over U.S. strategic
nuclear forces.

SRF operational facilities were located in various military districts around the
Soviet Union including Moscow, the Urals, Siberia, Kiev, Belorussia, and TransBaikal. These weapons were used to threaten tactical, intermediate range targets
such as NATO forces and populations in Western Europe, and strategic long-range
targets such as China and the United States. Specific SRF launch facilities such as
Kapustin Yar, Plesetsk, and Tyuratam became the targets for U.S. aerial and space
surveillance and reconnaissance as they sought to determine the quantity and
quality of Soviet nuclear forces and verify Soviet compliance and particularly noncompliance with U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements.
Making accurate estimate intelligence estimates about SRF intentions and
capabilities was particularly challenging due to the virtual impossibility of U.S. and
allied intelligence agencies being able to get human agents to successfully
penetrate and extract reliable information from these highly secret facilities.
Consequently, the U.S. and its allies were forced to rely on satellite, signals, and
measurement intelligence to attempt to determine the intentions, quality, and
quantity of the SRF. These efforts achieved both success and failure, and their
accuracy would be the subject of often contentious debate between various
branches of the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. national security
policymakers.

Weapons produced for SRF by the Soviet defense industry and deployed
against a global array of targets included the SS-9, deployed in 1967 with a twostage liquid propellant engine with a range of at least 10,200 kilometers capable
of carrying three warheads; the SS-18, with similar capabilities and range whose
numbers were estimated to be 308 at the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse; and the
intermediate range SS-20, deployed between 1976-1988, which was a two-stage
solid-fuel-propellant carrying three warheads with an operational range of 5,500
kilometers targeted toward NATO forces and populations in Europe.
Soviet strategic planners had to adjust to changes in U.S. nuclear weapons
development and strategy just as U.S. planners had to adjust to Soviet weapons
developments and strategy. The U.S. adoption of counterforce doctrine in 1974
stressing targeting Soviet military assets with nuclear weapons instead of civilian
targets was criticized by Brezhnev as threatening Soviet nuclear forces--whose
parity with U.S. nuclear forces, he believed, was a key foundational basis for
ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) arms control negotiations.
SRF experienced significant successes in becoming the world’s preeminent
strategic nuclear power. The program also experienced failure in the form of the
bureaucratic stagnation and the lack of quality control incentives inherent in
centrally planned economies. The enormous financial investment in SRF and

overall military spending helped contribute to stagnant and declining economic
development in civilian Soviet economic sectors. Arms control treaties with the
U.S. reduced some of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal in the 1970s and 1980s.
Soviet legacy nuclear weapons remain a significant part of the Russian
Federation’s nuclear deterrent and the presence and possible use of nuclear
weapons remain significant components in Russian military doctrine two decades
after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
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